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CONSTITUTIONAL HYPOCRISY 
Girardeau A. Spann 
INTRODUCTION 
My legal realist inclinations leave me largely agnostic about 
the particular provisions that happen to be included in any 
particular constitution. That is because both written and 
unwritten constitutions seem more likely to reflect than to 
prescribe the normative values of the cultures that adopt them. 
As a result, the substantive, structural, and procedural provisions 
of the present United States Constitution seem perfectly 
adequate to promote justice—at least in a culture that is 
genuinely committed to the cause of justice. No constitution is 
likely to promote justice in a culture that lacks such a 
commitment. Nevertheless, there is one change that I would 
make if I were rewriting our current Constitution. I would 
eliminate the institution of judicial review. 
Judicial review is commonly thought to facilitate an 
acceptable degree of convergence between the abstract 
principles celebrated in our written Constitution and the actual 
practices of our political culture in the conduct of its day-to-day 
affairs. However, I fear that judicial review, in fact, serves 
precisely the opposite function. For example, the United States 
Constitution rests heavily on the abstract principle of equality. 
The equality principle, which seems to be a staple of most 
mature legal cultures, incorporates an a priori normative belief 
that justice requires like things to be treated alike. But the 
political culture often prefers to allocate benefits and burdens in 
ways that violate the equality principle, by according differential 
treatment to individuals and groups based on characteristics such 
as race, gender, wealth, social class, sexuality, political affiliation, 
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religious conviction, and the like. I suspect that the culture’s 
commitment to abstract equality is as genuine as the culture’s 
inability to resist the lure of self-interested favoritism. As a 
result, the hypocrisy entailed in proclaiming equality while 
practicing discrimination can be expected to generate a level of 
cognitive dissonance that, if left unchecked, would be 
destabilizing. 
Contrary to what one might initially suspect, in this context, 
destabilization would be a good thing. It would exert pressure on 
the culture to cease its discriminatory behavior, or at least to a-
bandon its claim of fidelity to the equality principle. But the 
perceived conflict between principle and practice will not have 
this salutary effect if the dissonance between the two can 
somehow be dissipated. My fear is that the institution of judicial 
review serves this dissonance-reduction function well enough to 
preserve and protect the hypocrisy of the political culture. The 
culture, of course, has other dissonance-reduction techniques at 
its disposal. But the hypocrisy function of judicial review is 
particularly offensive, because it utilizes self-deception to make 
the practice of oppression actually appear to be noble. Because 
it is difficult to identify any truly benign function that judicial 
review has served in United States culture, I would rewrite the 
Constitution to make the institution of judicial review itself 
unconstitutional. There are, of course, practical problems 
entailed in “rewriting” a Constitution to eliminate a provision 
that never actually appears in the Constitution, and in describing 
the precise forms of “judicial review” that I would preclude. But, 
as will become apparent, there is no need to resolve those 
practical details at the present time.1 
I. REALISM 
The legal realists have taught us that doctrine does not 
determine outcomes. Moreover, the postmodern extension of 
realist thought into the general realm of rational epistemology 
now engenders skepticism about all causal accounts that purport 
to transcend the normative perspectives of those who offer them. 
Because the United States Constitution is a repository of 
doctrinal assertions, resting on the particular set of 
epistemological conventions that we utilize to give the document 
 
 1. For an argument establishing the practical viability of abolishing judicial review 
with respect to acts of Congress see Mark Tushnet, Abolishing Judicial Review, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 581 (2011). My argument is more ethereal. 
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meaning, it would be unrealistic to expect the Constitution to do 
anything more than reflect the normative values of our political 
culture at particular points in its evolution. By “our culture” or 
“our political culture” I mean that idealized collection of “us” 
who believe in abstractions that are commonly thought to 
constitute the American way of life—e.g., universal unalienable 
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness—but who also 
tolerate deviations in practice from the abstract norms that we 
espouse—e.g., poverty, parochialism, and xenophobic 
intolerance. The Constitution cannot constrain our actions, or 
our beliefs, in a way that causes us to become someone other 
than who we are. 
A. CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Constitutionalism entails the belief that legitimate 
governmental power is limited by fundamental principles 
contained in a source of higher law that supersedes policies 
adopted through the ordinary political process. In United States 
culture, that higher law is articulated in a written Constitution, 
whose provisions are ultimately enforced through the institution 
of judicial review. Marbury v. Madison,2 therefore, recognized a 
countermajoritarian power in the politically insulated Supreme 
Court to invalidate representative branch actions that violate the 
fundamental principles contained in the Constitution. That is the 
way that constitutionalism and judicial review are supposed to 
work.3 But there are alternate accounts. 
Legal realism has taught us that legal doctrine—including the 
doctrine embedded in the Constitution—is alone too indeter-
minate to resolve disputes. Whether focusing on constitutional 
text, original intent, or one’s favored theory of constitutional 
interpretation, there is always adequate play in the doctrine to 
support divergent outcomes. As a result, constitutional meaning is 
inevitably vulnerable to the normative values and political 
preferences of those doing the interpreting—including Justices 
sitting on the Supreme Court.4 It is, therefore, difficult to 
imagine a Supreme Court interpreting vague insistences on “due 
process” and “equal protection—or even absolute prohibitions 
 
 2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 3. See, e.g., Constitutionalism, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Constitutionalism (last visited Oct. 27, 2011); Judicial Review, WIKIPEDIA, http://en. 
wikipedia.org/wiki/Judicial_review (last visited Oct. 27, 2011). 
 4. See Note, ‘Round and ‘Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to Critical 
Legal Scholarship, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1670–76 (1982). 
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on “abridging the freedom of speech” or “impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts”—without being influenced by the 
values and preferences of the Justices themselves.5 If that were 
not the case, Supreme Court confirmation hearings would focus 
on a nominee’s analytical abilities rather than on a nominee’s 
position concerning controversial political issues, and Senators 
would not vote so closely along party lines. 
The legal realists sought to counteract the indeterminacy of 
doctrine by pairing law with foundational principles rooted in 
procedural regularity, or in their own preferred social sciences. 
However, the critical legal studies movement then applied realist 
indeterminacy insights to the foundational principles of the 
realists themselves, in order to demonstrate that those principles 
were no more determinate than the legal doctrines they had 
been offered to bolster.6 As described by Robin West, the critical 
legal studies movement emphasized that doctrinal interpretations 
tended to skew outcomes in favor of existing power relationships 
by reinforcing the view that those outcomes were not only neutral 
and necessary, but were properly divorced from extra-legal moral 
or political concerns. Utilizing the analytical technique of 
deconstruction to expose the illusion of “false necessity” on 
which doctrinal outcomes typically rested, the critical legal 
studies movement sought to neutralize the often oppressive 
power of “liberal legalism” to perpetuate the status quo. As a 
normative matter, therefore, the critical legal studies movement 
tended to favor progressive policies and politics. But as critical 
legal studies matured into a full-blown postmodern 
epistemological movement, the normative predispositions of 
critical legal studies themselves came to be recognized as yet 
another set of contingent and socially constructed principles.7 So 
understood, postmodernism, carried indeterminacy to its logical 
extreme by, ironically, questioning the coherence of the logical 
rationality that is typically offered to justify the application of 
judicial power. Let me emphasize, it is not that there is no 
difference between right and wrong. It is only that doctrine and 
syllogistic analysis cannot reliably illuminate the distinction 
between the two. 
 
 5. See, U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process); id. amend XIV, § 1 (due process & 
equal protection); id. amend. I (free speech); id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (obligation of contracts). 
 6. See Note, supra note 4, at 1676–86 (1982). 
 7. See ROBIN WEST, Critical Legal Studies—The Missing Years, in NORMATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION Ch. 3 (2011). 
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B. TRICAMERALISM 
Judges are not necessarily misbehaving when they consult 
extra-legal values and preferences in giving meaning to 
constitutional provisions. They have no other option. Abstract 
constitutional principles cannot acquire operative meaning in a 
way that is independent from the perspectives and experiences 
of the judges who interpret those principles. But it would be a 
mistake to think that something more than judicial construction 
is what is going on. Ultimately, it is the Justices on the Supreme 
Court—and not the provisions of the Constitution—that are 
resolving the constitutional disputes brought before the Court. 
That should cause us to have more realist expectations about the 
nature of constitutionalism. The Supreme Court is better under-
stood as yet another policymaking branch of a tricameral 
legislature than as a reliable guardian of constitutional 
principles. As such, the Court is more likely to reflect than to 
prescribe the normative values of our culture. 
Although it is now common for us to accord the Supreme 
Court final say over controversial social policy issues such as 
abortion, school prayer and affirmative action, this judicial 
policymaking was not within the original conception of judicial 
review. Bill Treanor has emphasized that, prior to Marbury, 
judicial review was viewed as a natural outgrowth of the popular 
sovereignty expressed in our written Constitution—but not as a 
substitute for popular sovereignty. Accordingly, state and fed-
eral courts invalidated statutes raising structural or process 
problems. They did so where legislation affected coordinate 
branch institutions such as juries or courts that were not part of 
the political process producing the statutes, or where a state 
statute infringed on a sphere of power reserved for the federal 
government. However, where such structural concerns were 
absent, courts generally deferred to the political judgments of 
state and federal legislatures.8 In Marbury itself, Chief Justice 
Marshall disclaimed jurisdiction over questions that are “in their 
nature political.”9 
History and the Marbury admonition notwithstanding, 
contemporary judicial review now often entails the substitution 
of Supreme Court policy preferences for the legislative and 
 
 8. See WILLIAM MICHAEL TREANOR, THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1780-1803, at 1–7 (2010) (unpublished manuscript); William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–60 (2005). 
 9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). 
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executive policy preferences that the Court invalidates in the 
exercise of judicial review. Such countermajoritarian judicial 
policymaking cannot be justified in the name of 
constitutionalism, because realist insights make it difficult to 
maintain that the Court’s decisions emanate from the 
Constitution rather than from the discretion of the Justices 
themselves. Depending on the sympathies of the Justices, the 
Constitution could be read to require socialism,10 or to support 
the laissez-faire ideology of the Tea Party movement.11 
Accordingly, some commentators have argued for a more 
limited judicial role, advocating judicial minimalism in the 
exercise of judicial review as a means of facilitating democratic 
policymaking.12 And in the proposed Judiciary Act of 2009—
reminiscent of the New Deal Court packing plan—highly 
regarded constitutional scholars across the political spectrum 
have favored heightened control over the Supreme Court by the 
political branches.13 
Because there is no way to insulate judicial review from 
judicial policy preferences, the Supreme Court is better 
understood as a policymaking branch of government than as a 
branch that operates above politics. It is as if the Court were the 
third house of a tricameral legislature in which each house repre-
sents different constituencies.14 Mark Tushnet has described how 
terms of office affect political responsiveness. The House of 
Representatives is directly elected to represent local 
constituencies, and its two-year term of office makes it 
responsive to relatively immediate political trends. The 
 
 10. See Mark V. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REV. 694 (1980) (reviewing 
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1978)). 
 11. See Matthew Continetti, The Two Faces Of The Tea Party: Rick Santelli, Glenn 
Beck, And The Future Of The Populist Insurgency, WEEKLY STANDARD, June 28, 2010, 
at 18, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/articles/two-faces-tea-party. 
 12. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON 
THE SUPREME COURT (1999); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY 
FROM THE COURTS (1999); MARK TUSHNET, WHY THE CONSTITUTION MATTERS 
(2010). But see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Judicial Minimalism (2008) (Harvard Univ. 
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 08-40) (suggesting that “the justifications 
for judicial minimalism are unconvincing in many contexts”), http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1274200 
 13. See Four Proposals For A Judiciary Act (February 9, 2009) 
(http://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm). 
 14. Cf. GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND REMEDIES 191–92 (2000) 
(suggesting that Supreme Court acts like a political policymaking body); ALEC STONE, 
THE BIRTH OF JUDICIAL POLITICS IN FRANCE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL COUNCIL IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 3–19, 209–21 (1992) (arguing that the French 
Constitutional Council operates in ways similar to a legislative chamber). 
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President is elected indirectly by state electors in the Electoral 
College to represent the interests of the national majority, 
serving a four-year term that makes the President somewhat less 
responsive to immediate political trends. The Senate was initially 
elected indirectly by state legislatures to represent state 
constituencies. Although it is now directly elected, the Senate’s 
six-year term of office makes it even less responsive to 
immediate political trends, but more responsive to durable 
political coalitions. The Supreme Court is “elected” indirectly, 
through Presidential nomination and Senate confirmation. Life 
tenure gives Supreme Court justices even longer “terms of 
office,” with the actual tenure of a Supreme Court justice since 
1970 averaging 26.1 years.15 This not only insulates the Court 
from immediate political trends, but makes it sufficiently 
resistant to social change that the Court ends up representing 
those political constituencies who favor maintaining the status 
quo.16 The Supreme Court can, therefore, be viewed either as the 
third branch of a policymaking legislature (consisting of the 
House, the Senate and the Court), or as the third branch of a 
policymaking federal government (consisting of Congress, the 
President and the Court). 
Once the Supreme Court is viewed as a legislative-type 
policymaking body, it becomes unrealistic to expect the Court to 
expound constitutional meaning in a detached or disinterested 
manner. Because the Court is endogenous in the legislative 
policymaking process, it does not make sense to view Supreme 
Court adjudication as an exogenous check on legislative 
policymaking excesses. However, because judicial review gives 
the Court veto power at the final stage of the policymaking 
process, it does make sense to view Supreme Court adjudication 
as reflecting the evolving normative values of the culture at the 
time the adjudication occurs. It is as if the Court were utilizing 
constitutional exposition to certify cultural acceptance of policies 
 
 15. See Mark Tushnet, The Politics Of Constitutional Law, in THE POLITICS OF 
LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 223–26 (David Kairys ed., 1st ed. 1982) (discussing the 
political responsiveness of various branches); see also Steven G. Calabresi & James 
Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 769, 770–71 (2006) (discussing the average Supreme Court tenure). The 
average tenure from 1789-1971 was 14.9 years. See id. 
 16. See GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND RACIAL MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 99–103 (1993). 
Although one might argue that the Supreme Court sometimes upsets rather than protects 
the status quo, such progressive victories can often be viewed as simply reflecting 
contemporary majoritarian political preferences. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, 
Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992). 
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that reflect the lowest common denominator among the various 
political constituencies represented by the three branches of our 
tricameral policymaking government. If the Constitution means 
only what the Supreme Court says it means—and the Supreme 
Court ends up reflecting rather than prescribing the normative 
values that are shared by the prevailing political culture—it 
probably does not much matter what particular provisions the 
Constitution happens to contain. Nevertheless, I would rewrite 
the Constitution to preclude judicial review as needlessly 
pernicious. 
II. DISSONANCE 
The reason that judicial review is pernicious is that it often 
facilitates hypocrisy. This can be illustrated by considering the 
manner in which the political culture has implemented the 
equality principle that permeates the Constitution. Although the 
culture’s rhetorical commitment to the principle of abstract 
equality is demonstrably strong, the culture’s operational com-
mitment to the practice of actual equality is noticeably weak. 
The ensuing divergence between principle and practice can 
generate a degree of cultural dissonance that would be 
destabilizing if it were not somehow reduced. I do not intend to 
suggest that such dissonance is limited to the equality principle 
alone. In fact, I think dissonance can be generated in the 
implementation of any principle. But the dissonance attendant 
to the equality principle is usefully illustrative precisely because 
it is so foundational. 
A. EQUALITY 
The equality principle—which embodies the a priori belief 
that like things should be treated alike—seems to be ubiquitous 
in contemporary legal cultures.17 In United States culture, the 
equality principle has even been viewed as flowing from natural 
law.18 There can, of course, be difficulties in deciding when things 
 
 17. See, e.g., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, 
U.N. Doc A/810 at 71, pmbl., arts 1, 2, 7, 10, 16, 21, 23 & 26 (1948) ; RONALD DWORKIN, 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272–73 (1977); VICKI C. JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 197–99 (2010); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 237–38 (1971); Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 
537, 543 n.20, 547 n.33 (1982).  
 18. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1–2 (U.S. 1776); Abraham 
Lincoln, Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Cemetery at Gettysburg, reprinted 
in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 734 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1946); 
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, reprinted in WHY WE CAN’T 
!!!SPAN-273-CONSTITUTIONAL HYPOCRISY.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  2:34 PM 
2011] CONSTITUTIONAL HYPOCRISY 565 
 
are alike or different (e.g. determining whether particular gender 
differences are real or socially constructed). The equality 
principle can also conflict with a legal culture’s commitment to 
other principles, such as the principle that protects individual 
liberty (e.g. determining whether prohibitions on racial 
discrimination are compelled by the equality principle, or pre-
cluded by the liberty principle’s protection of associational 
freedom). Some liberal theorists, such as John Rawls, believe 
that the right to equal liberty has lexical priority over the right to 
equality in the distribution of economic and social resources.19 
Others, such as Ronald Dworkin, believe that equality is a 
necessary component of any liberty worth protecting.20 Because 
the equality principle transcends legal cultures, theorists such as 
Vicki Jackson believe that comparative constitutional engage-
ment can illuminate the range of approaches available to 
mediate the tensions that often exist between the equality and 
liberty principles, and within the equality principle itself.21 Re-
gardless of how one might resolve any potential conflict between 
liberty and equality, it seems plain that the equality principle is 
fundamental. 
The emphasis that liberal theorists place on equality seems 
to be replicated in constitutional doctrine. Since 1868, the 
Fourteenth Amendment has contained an express Equal 
Protection Clause, but even the Fifth Amendment Due Process 
Clause adopted in 1791 constitutionalized an unwritten equality 
principle.22 What might be less apparent is that many of the other 
substantive guarantees of the Constitution also rest on a 
requirement of government neutrality—a requirement that itself 
embodies a commitment to equal treatment, and that seems 
perfectly appropriate given the foundational role that the 
equality principle plays in our culture. For example, the so-called 
constitutional right to vote has been treated as more of a 
safeguard against discriminatory abridgment than as an 
unqualified grant of the franchise.23 
 
WAIT 80 (1964), available at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_ 
Birmingham.html (1963). 
 19. See RAWLS, supra note 17, at 42–43, 60–65, 150–56, 243–51. 
 20. See DWORKIN, supra note 17, at 266–78. 
 21. See JACKSON, supra note 17 at 197–226. 
 22. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; id. amend. V; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
499–500 (1954) (finding an unwritten equality principle in the Fifth Amendment Due 
Process Clause). 
 23. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XV; Crawford v. Marion Cnty Election Bd., 553 
U.S. 181, 189–91 (2008); Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); Reynolds v. Sims, 977 
U.S. 533, 554–56 (1964).  
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Although the First Amendment free speech guarantee is 
written in absolute terms, it has been interpreted to permit 
considerable government regulation of speech and expressive 
activity. But in the absence of a showing that would satisfy strict 
scrutiny, the government must remain neutral with respect to the 
content or viewpoint of the speech that it is regulating. That 
means that, as a regulator, the government cannot consti-
tutionally discriminate in favor of speech that it likes or against 
speech that it dislikes.24 Similar neutrality requirements prohibit 
government discrimination in regulating symbolic speech25 or 
access to the public forum.26 The First Amendment religion 
clauses preclude the government from establishing religion and 
from prohibiting the free exercise thereof.27 But once again, the 
absolute language of the religion clauses has been read primarily 
to prohibit discriminatory departures from neutrality with 
respect to religion or religious denominations.28 
The term “substantive due process” may be a literal 
oxymoron, but it is now firmly established in our constitutional 
jurisprudence. Substantive due process rights are rarely 
unqualified, but rather, are rights against which the Constitution 
tends to prohibit discrimination. Accordingly, the unenumerated 
substantive due process right to privacy does not guarantee a 
right to abortion, but rather requires only a semblance of 
government neutrality. The government, therefore, cannot 
punish someone for having an abortion. But it also need not 
fund someone’s abortion, even if it funds other pregnancy-
related health care including childbirth. All it need do is remain 
neutral with respect to an individual’s own abortion pref-
erences.29 There also appears to be a substantive due process 
right to reject life-saving medical treatment30 but not a right to 
assisted suicide.31 By invoking the distinction between acts and 
 
 24. E.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381–90 (1992). 
 25. E.g., Tex. v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406–07, 414–20 (1989). 
 26. E.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176–78 (1983). 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend I. 
 28. E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) (requiring State 
neutrality under the Establishment Clause); Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of 
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-82 (1990) (requiring State neutrality under the Free 
Exercise Clause). 
 29. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312–18 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 
464, 471–74 (1977). 
 30. See Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U. S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The 
principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in 
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”)  
 31. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722–26 (1997). 
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omissions, the government is viewed as neutrally declining to 
penalize or subsidize individual end-of-life choices. 
The substantive due process right to sexual privacy prohibits 
the government from penalizing same-sex intimate conduct,32 
although it does not presently require the government to 
subsidize same sex marriage with formal recognition.33 Similarly, 
there is a substantive due process right to travel whose exercise 
the government may not penalize,34 but the neutrality required 
by the equality principle does not require the government to 
subsidize the right by purchasing the traveler’s bus ticket.35 A 
recently revived view of the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges 
and Immunities Clause now contains a comparable prohibition 
on discrimination between old and new residents with respect to 
the distribution of government benefits,36 and the Article IV 
Privileges and Immunities Clause contains an express 
prohibition on discrimination based on state citizenship.37 
The state action requirement that serves as the gatekeeper 
for Fourteenth Amendment safeguards is notoriously elusive, 
because state action can be detected beneath any form of public 
or private action if one is inclined to look for it. As a result, the 
most coherent efforts to prescribe meaning for the state action 
requirement entail a determination of whether the government 
has remained neutral while engaging in the background state 
action that is at issue.38 Accordingly, granting a liquor license to a 
racially discriminatory private club does not constitute state 
action when done as part of a neutral administrative scheme,39 
but enforcing a racially restrictive real property covenant does 
constitute state action when done as part of a pattern of 
historical discrimination.40 Even the protection of fundamental 
liberties themselves that are guaranteed by the Constitution, 
such as the right to procreate, sometimes takes the form of 
prohibitions on discrimination. The Supreme Court has never 
 
 32. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003). 
 33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–36 (1996). 
 34. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629–38 (1969) (finding a right to travel). 
 35. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 n.8 (1977) (“Shapiro . . . did not hold that 
States would penalize the right to travel interstate by refusing to pay the bus fares of the 
indigent travelers.”). 
 36. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 502–07 (1999). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
 38. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THEMES FOR THE CONSTITUTION’S THIRD CENTURY 229–31, 
238–41, 245–48 (4th ed. 2009). 
 39. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171–79 (1972). 
 40. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18–23 (1948). 
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reversed its decision permitting the involuntary sterilization of 
people who are mentally retarded,41 but it has invalidated the use 
of such sterilization in a discriminatory manner.42 
There is little doubt that the culture honors the abstract 
principle of equality. Equality is a widely shared moral precept, 
and it pervades many areas of contemporary constitutional law. 
Indeed, most of the interesting provisions in the Constitution 
ultimately boil down to mere guarantees of equal treatment. 
However, it is also clear that the culture fails to honor the 
abstract principle of equality in practice. This, of course, leaves 
the culture vulnerable to the charge of hypocrisy. 
B. HYPOCRISY 
Although United States culture is rhetorically committed to 
the principle that like things should be treated alike, in actual 
practice, the culture commonly discriminates against individuals 
and groups on the basis of characteristics that would seem to be 
illegitimate. Discrimination is illegitimate under the equality 
principle when it is based on characteristics that are irrelevant, 
or only marginally relevant, to the instrumental objectives for 
which a classification is being invoked. Unfortunately, much of 
the culture’s discriminatory behavior falls into this category. It is 
readily apparent that the culture discriminates in the allocation 
of benefits and burdens on the basis of characteristics such as 
race, gender, wealth, social class, sexuality, political affiliation, 
and religious conviction. But those characteristics are rarely 
relevant to the culture’s stated instrumental objectives. Rather, 
such discrimination is often based on inaccurate cultural 
stereotypes—or worse, is practiced in tacit defiance of the 
equality principle itself. And professing adherence to the 
equality principle while practicing invidious discrimination is, by 
definition, hypocritical. 
As a statistical matter, it is no secret that white males in the 
United States tend to do better than racial minorities or women. 
Minorities are dramatically worse off than whites with respect to 
income, wealth, poverty, housing, employment, the criminal 
justice system, healthcare, and access to consumer goods.43 
Although women have made significant educational advances 
 
 41. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207–08 (1927). 
 42. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 537–43 (1942). 
 43. See, e.g., Mario Barnes et al., A Post-race Equal Protection?, 98 GEO. L.J. 967, 
982-92 (2010); Girardeau A. Spann, Disparate Impact, 98 GEO. L.J. 1133, 1151 (2010). 
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and now comprise half of the US workforce, women still remain 
worse off than men with respect to pay, promotions, job category 
tracking, education in high-paying disciplines, work schedule 
flexibility, homemaking and caregiving responsibilities, corporate 
leadership positions, and political leadership positions.44 Women 
are also disproportionately the victims of sexual violence,45 
especially minority women.46 But the statistics are largely beside 
the point. 
Everyone who lives in the culture understands that we 
discriminate against those whom we view as different from 
ourselves. Recognizing this, a group of white college students in 
an informal study concluded that it would take $1 million per 
year in damages to compensate them if they were suddenly 
transformed from being white to being black.47 And I suspect 
that few males think that their economic, social or political 
fortunes would be improved by sex change operations that 
permitted them to become female. In addition, the culture’s 
tolerance for people with nontraditional sexual orientations has 
always been greatly outweighed by its intolerance, and we 
overwhelmingly continue to prohibit same-sex marriage. Being 
poor is not a crime, nor is being a member of a disadvantaged 
socio-economic group. But those of us who do not share those 
characteristics rarely live near, or spend much time with, those of 
us who do. As bad as the economic inequalities occasioned by 
race and poverty may be, they are in fact understated and 
exacerbated by incarceration inequalities that are also based on 
race and poverty.48 Many of us are anxious to fight the perils of 
unlawful immigration with overbroad profiling techniques, even 
though those techniques will disproportionately require 
detention and identification papers for citizens and lawful aliens 
who do not appear to be of European descent.49 The culture at 
 
 44. See, e.g., Mary Ann Mason, Still Earning Less, CHRONICLE. HIGHER EDUC., 
Jan. 13, 2010, http://chronicle.com/article/Still-Earning-Less/63482/; see generally Maria 
Shriver, The Shriver Report (Heather Boushley & Ann O’Leary, eds. 2009) http:// 
www.shriverreport.com/awn/shriverReport.pdf. 
 45. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Disputing Male Sovereignty: On United 
States v. Morrison, 114 HARV. L. REV. 135, 137–45 (2000). 
 46. See, e.g., Meghan Condon, Bruise of a Different Color: The Possibilities of Restorative 
Justice for Minority Victims of Domestic Violence, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
487, 489–95 (2010). 
 47. See ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK & WHITE, SEPARATE, 
HOSTILE, UNEQUAL 32 (1992). 
 48. See BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA 85–107 
(2006). 
 49. See Jerry Markon & Stephanie McCrummen, Judge Blocks Some Sections of 
Arizona Law, WASH. POST, July 29, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.washingtonpost. 
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large is reasonably tolerant of the mainstream Republicans and 
Democrats among us. But if one wishes to denounce a politician 
with whom one disagrees, a sensible strategy may be to label the 
politician a socialist and to remind people that Hitler and Lenin 
were socialists too.50 Since the recent economic recession began 
in 2007, the culture has become preoccupied with unem-
ployment, even though overall unemployment rates are simply 
approaching the pre-recession unemployment rates that have 
typically been suffered by racial minorities.51 And of course, if 
you want to build a religious cultural center near the site of the 
World Trade Center, it is probably best to ensure that your 
religion is Judeo-Christian rather than Islamic.52 
Despite our emphatic cultural commitment to the equality 
principle, our cultural commitment to the practice of invidious 
discrimination appears to be equally strong. The duplicity 
entailed in this divergence between principle and practice 
triggers our cultural aversion to hypocrisy. Indeed, our aversion 
to hypocrisy, and the reliance that it upsets, is so strong that it 
underlies the very concept of estoppel—a concept that has been 
a part of our common law jurisprudence for centuries. For 
example, it is this distaste for hypocrisy that causes us to react 
with such anger and disappointment when we learn that officials 
who publicly endorse conventional propriety and family values 
have hypocritically engaged in illicit sexual improprieties.53 And 
most of us failed to react well when we saw wealthy free-market 
bankers hypocritically ask for multibillion dollar government 
bailouts after their lending practices caused a financial collapse.54 
 
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/28/AR2010072801794.html. 
 50. See Dana Milbank, Wrong and Reich in Mason City, WASH. POST., July 18, 
2010, at A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2010/07/16/AR2010071602855.html. 
 51. See Kai Filion, Downcast Unemployment Forecast: Targeted Job Creation 
Policies Necessary to Offset Grim 2010 Projections, EPI ISSUE BRIEF #270, Jan 14, 2010 
(http://epi.3cdn.net/d9904b716d3cf62538_psm6bnec9.pdf). 
 52. See Javier Hernandez, Planned Sign of Tolerance Bringing Division Instead, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2010/07/14/nyregion/14center.html; see also Liz Goodwin, Anti-mosque Protests on the 
Rise, Say Muslim Advocates, YAHOO NEWS, July 21, 2010 (http://news.yahoo.com/ 
s/yblog_upshot/20100721/pl_yblog_upshot/anti-mosque-protests-on-the-rise-say-muslim-
advocates). 
 53. See Ken Rudin, Sanford the Latest in a Series of Political Sex Scandals, NPR 
POLITICAL JUNKIE, June 24, 2009 (http://www.npr.org/blogs/politicaljunkie/ 
2009/06/sanford_just_the_latest_sex_sc.html) (discussing hypocritical sexual behavior of 
officials including Mark Sanford, John Ensign, John Edwards, Kwame Kilpatrick, Eliot 
Spitzer, Larry Craig, David Vitter, Mark Foley, and Jim McGreevey). 
 54. See generally EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC 
JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 73–127 (2d ed. 2010) (describing 
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More to the point, I have an even stronger adverse reaction 
whenever I hear Senators and Supreme Court nominees 
hypocritically insist that Supreme Court justices should apply the 
law rather than make the law—as if they honestly believed that 
there was a meaningful distinction between the two activities.55 
Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that when individuals 
experience high levels of hypocritical dissonance between their 
behavior and their beliefs, they will feel strong psychological 
pressure to reduce that dissonance.56 If we assume heuristically 
that cognitive dissonance theory works the same way on the 
cultural level as it does on the individual psychological level—or 
if we assume that cultures can only act through individual agents 
who themselves respond to psychological pressures—cognitive 
dissonance theory can help to explain why judicial review is 
potentially pernicious. We do not like to think of ourselves as 
hypocrites. And judicial review is a cultural device that we can 
use to dissipate the dissonance that we would otherwise 
experience if forced to confront our own constitutional 
hypocrisy. 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Judicial review reduces cognitive dissonance by convincing 
the culture that its discriminatory behavior is consistent with—or 
even compelled by—the equality principle. While exploiting the 
inevitable indeterminacy of constitutional doctrine, the Supreme 
Court can rationalize our hypocrisy by turning it into 
praiseworthy constitutional behavior. Although judicial review is 
not the only dissonance-reduction technique that is available to 
the culture, it is perhaps the most offensive. By sanctifying 
deviations from the equality principle, judicial review permits 
the culture to feel as if it is doing something honorable when it 
engages in the practice of invidious discrimination. 
A. RATIONALIZATION 
Judicial review can rationalize the practice of illegitimate 
discrimination by making the culture’s oppressive behavior seem 
as if it flows rationally from the equality principle embodied in 
 
subprime lending collapse). 
 55. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 781–86 (1983) (discussing 
judicial confirmation ritual). 
 56. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 1–31 (1957). 
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the Constitution. This, in turn, provides an excuse for engaging 
in cultural practices that would otherwise seem 
unconstitutionally invidious. One of my friends has politely 
characterized my skepticism about judicial review as “utterly 
unpersuasive.” That characterization may prove ultimately 
correct, but to me it illustrates the strength of the hold that 
judicial review has on the culture. Given that other liberal 
democracies have historically favored parliamentary supremacy 
over judicial review57—and given the high degree of political 
deference that characterizes most judicial review even in the 
United States—one cannot help but wonder why judicial review 
has such a strong hold on us. I believe it is because judicial 
review helps us to camouflage our own hypocrisy. 
Peter Westen has argued that the abstract idea of equality 
lacks substantive content until it is paired with some normative 
principle against which similarities and differences can be 
assessed. However, once the normative assessment of similarities 
and differences has been made, there is no additional work for 
the equality principle to do. The equality principle simply 
generates the tautological pronouncement of a conclusion that 
was already determined by the normative analysis on which the 
equality principle rests.58 Whether or not one ultimately agrees 
with the Westen conclusion, his analysis—paired with the Realist 
indeterminacy insights discussed in Part I.A—does seem to 
illustrate that the concept of equality possesses sufficient 
imprecision to make it easily manipulable. And that imprecision 
also makes the concept available to facilitate constitutional 
hypocrisy. 
Judicial review has historically been very helpful in 
depicting discriminatory behavior as if it complied with the 
equality principle. Mike Seidman has argued that the Supreme 
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education59 actually made it 
easier to maintain racially segregated schools by denominating 
single-race schools unitary, and that the decision in Miranda v. 
Arizona60 made it easier to coerce confessions from criminal 
defendants by treating post-warning coerced confessions as if 
they were equivalent to voluntary confessions.61 I have argued 
 
 57. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 1 (discussing parliamentary supremacy in 
Netherlands) 
 58. See Westen, supra note 17, at 542–48. 
 59. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting official school segregation). 
 60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring police to give Miranda warnings). 
 61. See Seidman, supra note 16. 
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that, by exercising veiled majoritarian judicial review, the 
Supreme Court has actually made it easier for the culture to 
perpetuate the oppression of racial minorities.62 Indeed, most of 
the examples offered in Part II.A above, to illustrate how 
various substantive constitutional doctrines ultimately rest on 
the concept of equality, can also be offered to illustrate how the 
Supreme Court permits the culture to engage in discriminatory 
behavior under the guise of equality.63 
Although we claim to make the right to vote equally 
available, the Supreme Court has permitted racial and political 
minorities to be disproportionately disenfranchised64 and well-
funded interest groups to have disproportionate influence over 
elections.65 Despite the First Amendment claim that the 
government must remain neutral in its regulation of speech or 
access to the public forum, the Supreme Court has recognized 
exceptions when the government acts as a speaker,66 educator,67 
or proprietor,68 and has recognized exceptions when the 
government finds the speech to be particularly threatening.69 The 
Court has also allowed the government to deviate from religious 
neutrality by “establishing” subsidies for mainstream religions70 
and suppressing the “free exercise” of non-mainstream 
religions.71 The Court’s conception of “neutrality” with the right 
to abortion ends up permitting the government to favor 
childbirth over abortion, and to impose burdens on the right to 
 
 62. See generally SPANN, supra note 16. 
 63. See supra text accompanying notes 17–42. 
 64. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 185–89, 200–04 (2008) 
(upholding partisan Indiana voter ID law with alleged disparate impact on Democrats, 
racial minorities, poor and elderly). 
 65. Citizens United v FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating federal 
restrictions on corporate electioneering expenditures). 
 66. See, e.g., Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009) 
(upholding denial of religious display in public park as exercise of government speech). 
 67. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484, U.S. 260, 270–73 (1988) 
(upholding regulation of school newspaper by school as educator). 
 68. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303–04 (1974) 
(upholding advertising restriction on rapid transit vehicles by city acting in proprietary 
capacity). 
 69. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–48 (1969) (permitting 
suppression of speech having intent and likely effect of producing imminent lawless 
action). 
 70. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652–63 (2002) (upholding 
school voucher program that disproportionately benefitted religious schools). 
 71. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874–
76, 890 (1990) (upholding application of drug laws to prohibit religious use of peyote by 
Native American Church); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1878) 
(upholding prohibition on polygamy then practiced by Mormon church). 
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abortion when favored by mobilized political majorities.72 The 
Court makes the right to end-of-life medical deference 
discriminatorily available to those wish to end their suffering and 
indignity by declining medical interventions, but not to those 
who wish to do the same thing by receiving medical inter-
ventions.73 
So far, the substantive due process right to sexual privacy 
recognized by the Supreme Court ends up protecting 
heterosexual marriage but not same-sex marriage.74 Even the 
right to travel that the Court has held prohibits discrimination in 
the allocation of welfare benefits75 appears to permit 
discrimination in the allocation of other benefits, such as 
government jobs76 and tuition-free public education.77 The 
Court’s state action jurisprudence seems to permit or prohibit 
discrimination based on the Court’s own approval or disapproval 
of the underlying government action.78 And whether the 
Supreme Court would today permit involuntary sterilization—
say, of a promiscuous mentally retarded woman who did not 
understand the consequences of having sex—is likely to turn on 
whether the Court approves of the underlying policy 
determination made by the political body that has authorized 
such sterilization.79 
Because things are alike and different in myriad ways, the 
Supreme Court has enormous latitude in deciding what does and 
does not satisfy the equality principle. By manipulating 
analytical baseline assumptions and shifting levels of generality, 
the Court can decide when it wishes to protect or reject the 
culture’s forays into self-interested hypocrisy.80 The Court’s 
affirmative action cases provide perhaps the clearest example. 
When the political culture was in favor of racial affirmative 
action, the Supreme Court read the Constitution to permit and 
sometimes require affirmative action, reasoning that the concept 
 
 72. See cases cited supra note 29; Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132-33 (2007) 
(upholding federal statutory ban on so-called partial-birth abortions). 
 73. See cases cited supra note 32. 
 74. See cases cited supra note 33. 
 75. See cases cited supra notes 35–36. 
 76. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645, 646–47 
(1976) (upholding residency requirement for fire department employees) 
 77. See Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 333 (1983) (upholding residency 
requirement for tuition-free public schools). 
 78. See supra note 38–40. 
 79. See supra notes 41–42. 
 80. See Girardeau A. Spann, Constitutionalization, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 709, 721–46 
(2005) (discussing analytical techniques). 
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of equality required prospective compensation for present 
inequalities.81 Now that the political culture has come to oppose 
affirmative action, the Supreme Court has read the Constitution 
to hold affirmative action largely unconstitutional.82 Ironically, 
the Court has even read Brown effectively to require the 
resegregation of public schools.83 
Some of my colleagues have suggested that Supreme Court 
Justices are behaving in good faith when they endorse one of the 
many possible meanings of equality that the realists have taught 
us inevitably emanate from an indeterminate legal principle. 
Accordingly, decisions that I might view as discriminatorily 
oppressive do not necessarily generate dissonance on the part of 
the Court—or the culture that it represents—because those 
decisions are experienced as genuinely principled rather than as 
hypocritical by those who issue and endorse them. However, I 
do not believe that such decisions are made in good faith. The 
nation’s history of invidious discrimination based on race, 
gender, religion and an unfortunately broad range of other traits, 
is simply too long and too stark to escape notice when 
perpetuated by contemporary Supreme Court decisions. I 
believe that the Court—like the culture that it represents—is 
affirmatively choosing to perpetuate such discrimination when it 
issues such decisions, and that it must find some way to manage 
the dissonance created by that self-knowledge. Barry Friedman 
has demonstrated that the Supreme Court has typically reflected 
the will of the people.84 In a very fundamental sense, the will of 
the people has been to have their discriminatory inclinations 
sanctified by the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court has 
performed that function with religious conviction.85 
 
 81. See, e.g., Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 552 (1990) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny and upholding broadcast affirmative action); compare Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 333–34 (2003) (upholding law school affirmative action) with Gratz v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 244, 275–76 (2003) (invalidating college affirmative action); cf. United States v 
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 153–66 (1987) (plurality opinion) (upholding court-ordered 
affirmative action); Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers Int’l Ass’n v EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 
482–83 (1986) (upholding court-ordered affirmative action). 
 82. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying 
strict scrutiny and overruling Metro Broadcasting). 
 83. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709–
11 (2007); id. at 745–48. 
 84. See BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 85. Cf. Sanford Levinson, “The Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. 
CT. REV. 123, 130–32; 137–48 (using religion analogy to help explain Supreme Court 
legitimation function). 
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B. SANCTIFICATION 
The nature of judicial review is such that, when the 
Supreme Court pronounces the culture’s discriminatory 
practices to be consistent with the Constitution, it is sanctifying 
both inequality and the cultural inferiority that inequality 
connotes. The concept of sanctification conveys not only the idea 
of imparting moral and social approval, but also an act of 
purification that establishes freedom from sin.86 Moreover, the 
religious overtones of sanctification are appropriate because 
realist insights have taught us that a considerable leap of faith is 
required to believe that Supreme Court constitutional 
adjudication could genuinely turn discrimination into equality, 
and detach cultural discrimination from the invidiousness that it 
often reflects. 
Two now-infamous Supreme Court decisions serve to 
illustrate the manner in which the Supreme Court can sanctify 
the practice of cultural discrimination by certifying it as 
consistent with the concept of equality. In Dred Scott v. 
Sanford,87 the Court upheld the property rights of white 
slaveholders against the liberty interests of black slaves, by 
invalidating a congressional statute designed to limit the spread 
of slavery. In so doing, Chief Justice Taney used particularly 
demeaning language to constitutionalize the inferior status of 
blacks, whom the Court held could not be recognized as citizens 
within the meaning of the Constitution.88 In Bradwell v. Illinois, 
the Court held that women could be denied the right to practice 
law because of their gender.89 This time Justice Bradley’s 
concurring opinion used demeaning language to emphasize the 
inferiority of women as individuals whose natural state made 
them destined to be wives and mothers, unfit for the occupations 
 
 86. Sanctify Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM (last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 87. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that blacks could not be citizens within 
the meaning of the United States Constitution for purpose of establishing diversity 
jurisdiction and invalidating congressional statute enacted to limit spread of slavery, as 
interfering with property rights of slave owners), superseded by constitutional 
amendment, U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV. 
 88. Id. at 404–05, 407, 451–52. I realize that Dred Scott is not the perfect example to 
offer in support of this proposition, because the North ultimately responded to the 
decision with a Civil War and then overruled the decision with the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See FARBER, supra note 38, at 16–25. However, I suspect that the decision 
did provide sanctification to the South by giving constitutional succor to views that had 
prevailed throughout most of the nation during most of the era of slavery. The Dred Scott 
Court simply misidentified the culture that it was supposed to be serving in 1857. 
 89. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 139 (1872). 
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of civil life.90 Today, those holdings—and the language in which 
they were expressed—seem anachronistically invidious. But that 
is only because the political culture has evolved beyond the 
forms of unapologetic oppression that prevailed at the time 
those cases were decided. 
The culture now engages in other forms of discrimination 
that, in time, may come to be viewed as equally invidious. But 
contemporary judicial review continues to sanctify contemporary 
discrimination with demeaning language directed to the 
opponents of such discrimination. For example, Chief Justice 
Roberts has referred to race-conscious affirmative action 
remedies for past discrimination as “a sordid business”91 that is 
“pernicious,”92 and “odious to a free people whose institutions 
are founded upon the doctrine of equality,”93 as well as “patently 
unconstitutional.”94 The Court thus continues to dissipate 
dissonance by assuring the culture that its present forms of 
disparate treatment are not only consistent with the equality 
principle, but are in fact noble. The culture’s behavior is noble 
because it demonstrates the courage to reject claims alleging 
subtle forms of societal discrimination in favor of a 
straightforward understanding of facial equality that does not 
threaten to upset the status quo. Judicial review is particularly 
good at dissonance reduction because it facilitates self-interested 
self-deception. 
My opposition to judicial review is subject to two rather 
obvious objections. First, United States culture may be able to 
withstand more hypocrisy-related dissonance than I imagine. For 
example, one cannot fail to notice the vocal opposition that was 
leveled against the proposed “ground zero mosque” in New 
York City, and against proposed Muslim sites of worship in 
other parts of the United States. I must admit that this 
unabashed religious hostility to Islam does suggest a higher 
degree of tolerance for the dissonance generated by raw cultural 
hypocrisy than I would previously have predicted.95 However, I 
retain the hope that such opposition is both transient, and more 
of a marginal than a central component of contemporary United 
 
 90. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 91. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 511 (2006) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 92. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 
(2007). 
 93. Id. at 745–46. 
 94. Id. at 730, 732, 740. 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 52.  
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States culture. Nevertheless, I suspect that vocal mosque 
opposition would become even more widespread and durable if 
the Supreme Court were now to sanctify that opposition by 
ruling that the Constitution permits the forced relocation of 
Muslim sites of worship. 
The second obvious objection to my disenchantment with 
judicial review relates to dissonance reduction. Even if I am 
correct about the discomfort normally attendant to cognitive 
dissonance, other dissonance reduction techniques may simply 
fill any void that is left by the absence of judicial review. I 
concede that there are always other dissonance reduction 
techniques that the culture can invoke to deal with the fact that 
it professes equality while practicing discrimination. In fact, one 
of the primary skills possessed by successful politicians is the 
ability to convince voters that their own parochial interests 
coincide with fundamental overriding principles shared by 
worthy segments of the culture at large. So, regressive tax cuts 
are good because they stimulate economic growth; racial 
profiling is permissible because it helps keep our borders secure; 
gay marriage is bad because it undermines the fabric of 
American family life; and the casualties of foreign military 
interventions are defensible because they advance the war on 
terror. However, everyone realizes that politicians engage in 
partisan rhetoric, with equally strong partisan claims emanating 
from the other side. This realization, therefore, dilutes the 
effectiveness of mere politics as a dissonance-reduction 
technique. But judicial review is different. 
What makes judicial review a particularly offensive form of 
dissonance reduction is that not everyone concedes that the 
Supreme Court is just another political player. Most people insist 
that the Court is doing something different—something loftier, 
related to integrity, justice and fairness—when it interprets the 
Constitution. Even those who realize that the Court is influenced 
by politics are rarely willing to concede that the Court is simply 
engaged in political activity that is qualitatively indistinguishable 
from the actions of the representative branches. Judicial review 
is offensive because it is both offered to, and received by, the 
culture as a practice that is essentially good—rather than a 
practice that is essentially duplicitous. Even if it were shown—as 
perhaps it could be—that liberal democracies engage in precisely 
the same amount of hypocrisy whether they practice judicial 
review or not, I would still favor the elimination of judicial 
review. Utilizing doctrine to effectuate a form of collective 
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hypnosis, judicial review enables us to sidestep rather than 
confront our discriminatory and oppressive inclinations. It 
enables us to feel as if we are behaving in a principled manner, 
even though we must know that we are not. And it enables us to 
feel good about ourselves even though we do bad things to each 
other. That is why judicial review is well-suited to protecting our 
constitutional hypocrisy. And that is why judicial review is well-
suited to be dispensed with in my rewritten Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Legal realist insights—combined with the imprecision 
inherent in the concept of equality that underlies most 
constitutional provisions—make it difficult to claim that the 
Supreme Court is doing anything other than exercising 
policymaking discretion when it engages in the process of 
constitutional adjudication. As a result, I believe that the Court 
is better viewed as a political arm of a tricameral legislature than 
as an institution that operates above ordinary politics. 
Accordingly, judicial review is more likely to reflect the 
prevailing normative biases and predispositions of the culture 
than to constrain them. Therefore, it does not much matter what 
official provisions the Constitution contains. The political 
branches—including the Supreme Court—will simply read the 
Constitution to correspond to the behavior in which the culture 
wishes to engage. Nevertheless, I would rewrite the Constitution 
to preclude judicial review. 
United States culture relies on judicial review to ensure that 
its practices conform to its constitutional principles. But judicial 
review seems actually to legitimate discrepancies between 
principle and practice by convincing the culture that its baser 
discriminatory inclinations can be viewed as consistent with its 
loftier commitment to abstract equality. In so doing, judicial 
review serves to dissipate the cognitive dissonance that would 
otherwise provide pressure for the culture genuinely to live up to 
its constitutional principles. In short, judicial review facilitates 
the constitutional hypocrisy that is often practiced by United 
States culture, and it does so in a way that enables the culture to 
feel self-righteously proud of its expedient pursuit of political 
self-interest. 
There is a paradox lurking beneath the surface of my 
argument. I claim that constitutional provisions do not much 
matter, because they will simply reflect rather than constrain the 
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political behavior of the culture. At the same time I claim that 
the Constitution should nevertheless be rewritten to preclude 
judicial review, because judicial review facilitates constitutional 
hypocrisy. Logically, I cannot have it both ways—either the 
Constitution matters or it does not. In fact, I have been less 
troubled by logical inconsistency since I learned that light can be 
both a particle and a wave, but I understand that some people 
still take logical contradictions pretty seriously. So I have a 
proposal. If you will agree to think of the Supreme Court as 
simply part of a tricameral legislative policymaking process, I 
will agree to let the Court continue upholding or invalidating 
representative branch actions in the exercise of its judicial 
discretion. It will be as if a legislative proposal has simply 
succeeded or failed to secure the approval of a legislative 
chamber needed for its enactment. From the outside, this will 
appear to be the exercise of traditional judicial review. But from 
the inside, we will secretly realize that the Supreme Court’s 
function is simply to make us feel better about our often 
unprincipled cultural behavior. That way, we can begin to 
experience the dissonance that we should feel when we realize 
that our practices do not always live up to our aspirational 
norms, and we can then begin to make genuine efforts to try to 
do better. That way we can rewrite the Constitution without 
changing a single word. We can change its meaning simply by 
changing the way that we think about what is going on when we 
ask the Supreme Court to engage in the practice of judicial 
review. 
 
